Executive Summary: Notwithstanding its many internal contradictions, Pakistan remains a key actor in the Middle. Continue reading
Dr. Ömer Aslan is an Associate Fellow at Al Sharq Forum and an Assistant Professor at the Institute for Security Sciences at the Turkish National Police Academy (TNPA). He received his PhD from Bilkent University. Among his publications are two research reports with Al-Sharq Forum and four academic articles: “A Turkish Muslim Between Islamism and Turkish Nationalism: Seyyid Ahmet Arvasi [1932–88]”, Turkish Studies 15(3), (2014): 519-535; “‘Unarmed’ we Intervene, Unnoticed we Remain: the Deviant Case of the ‘February 28th Coup’ in Turkey”, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 43(3), (2016):360-377; “American Policy and Proliferation of Media as Causes of a New Type of Coup after the Cold War? Evidence from Turkey” (co-authored with Hakan Kıyıcı), Middle East Critique (accepted, forthcoming); “Turkish Foreign Terrorist Fighters and the Emergence of a New Kind of Radicalization” (co-authored with Necati Anaz and Mehmet Özkan), Turkish Studies 17(4), (2016): 618-642. His current research interests are military and politics in al-Sharq region, external actors and military coups d’état, media and military coups, radicalization and foreign fighters.
Post by Omer Aslan
Turkey’s ‘Fractured Military’ in Historical Perspective and Recommendations for a Military Reform Agenda
Executive Summary The AK Party government’s reaction to the failed July 15th coup attempt has been swift.. Continue reading
THE JULY 15TH FAILED COUP ATTEMPT IN TURKEY: Causes, Consequences, and Implications in Comparative Perspective
Executive Summary ■ On July 15th a group of soldiers inside the Turkish military—ordinarily an expert. Continue reading
The Russians flocking to Syria, a ‘lame duck’ American President, and a more daring Iran after the implementation of the nuclear deal with the west all imply that the ‘Islamic Alliance’ proposed hastily and clumsily by Saudi Arabia deserves more serious thought than it has hitherto been granted.
Political developments after the July 3rd coup in Egypt must be evaluated by taking into account the new character of coups d’état in the post-Cold War period. As a ‘network’ coup, carried out with the active participation of civilians from different sectors in the process, the coup annulled the possibility of the ‘engagement’ and ‘withdrawal’ of the Egyptian military from the system. Without the withdrawal of this entire network, which will be an utterly onerous task, the Egyptian system may only replicate what was once Turkey’s fate, a tutelary democracy, and that only in the long haul. In the meantime, Egyptian President Sisi will have to walk a tightrope to satisfy the demands of three parties: external pressures for economic liberalization and stability, the Egyptian military-as-institution, and his domestic constituency. The logic of the coup as a politicizing, destabilizing, and paranoia-breeding act, however, may defy all these purposes.